New publications

The last couple of months were pretty busy, and I was pleased to see three reports make it into publication:

  • A short case study on the varied impact of politics in Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia on the ability to translate Famine Early Warning Systems information into early action.
  • A critique of the (relatively) new EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, which I co-authored with Ahmed Soliman and Alex Vines at Chatham House.
  • An essay on the wider implications of recent violence in the Tana Delta for pre- and post-election stability in Kenya, which I co-authored with Nuur Mohamud Sheekh for African Arguments.
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Post-Meles analysis

There’s some useful analysis emerging following Meles’s death. In no particular order, some pieces I found helpful/interesting:

Rene Lefort’s early August essay on openDemocracy earlier in August was excellent, and remains a useful guide: http://www.opendemocracy.net/ren%C3%A9-lefort/ethiopia-after-meles
I also did some interviews, a couple of which might be worth listening to:
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Meles’s Death: National and Regional Implications

Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has died, ending weeks of intense speculation over his condition and throwing the country’s leadership into the next phase of an uncertain transition. A tense atmosphere in the country, especially in the capital, Addis Ababa, has been heightened, although stability has held throughout the period of Meles’s absence from office since late June.
It will be difficult for the ruling party – the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which is dominated by the Meles’s Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) – to replace Meles.  Developments in coming weeks in Ethiopia have the potential to affect the Horn of Africa’s political, economic and security landscape for years to come.
My short comment piece for Chatham House:

http://www.chathamhouse.org/media/comment/view/185419

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Ethiopia-Eritrea: Rising tensions amid new opportunities for engagement?

I’ve published a comment this week on the outlook for the most important fault line in the security dynamics of the Horn of Africa — that between Ethiopia and Eritrea.  Although tensions are rising, with Ethiopia taking an increasingly bellicose stance towards Eritrea this year, other shifts may indicate new opportunities for international engagement that could contribute to the breaking of the decade-old stalemate between the two.

Read the full comment on the Chatham House website:
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End of the Roadmap: Somalia after the London and Istanbul Conferences

I published a briefing note with Chatham House yesterday on the outlook for end of the Transition in Somalia, and for what comes after.  From the conclusions:
  • Indications are that, with continued international support and pressure, Somalia’s Transition Roadmap will continue towards its goal of handing over to a caretaker administration on 20 August, 2012.
  • As such, Somalia’s international partners should focus in the next few months on how to transform the momentum injected into the Roadmap process into policy attention and diplomatic support, or pressure, needed to see the caretaker administration develop into more of a government. A more functional government would focus on the provision of services beyond the attention already paid to the security sector. 
  • The end of the Roadmap will not signal an end to Somalia’s transition. The new administration will face many of the same challenges threatening the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), and some others generated by the Roadmap process itself. However some progress has been made in Mogadishu, and Somalis – especially in civil society and the private sector – are in a position to build upon that base. Constructive international engagement could support that process.

Read the report here:
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Gambella: Links between insecurity and land investments?

I’ve contributed some thoughts on linkages between insecurity and large-scale land deals in Ethiopia, amid other drivers of conflict in the country’s peripheries.   http://focusonthehorn.wordpress.com/2012/06/18/gambella-violence-and-land-deals-a-link/

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Peace, Bread and Land: Agricultural Investments in Ethiopia and the Sudans

I’ve released a report on large-scale land investments in Ethiopia and the Sudans through Chatham House.  From the conclusions:
  • Investment in land is not conflict-neutral, and given the history of violent conflict and mutual destabilization in the Horn of Africa there is potential for localized political grievances to turn into wider regional conflict.
     
  • There is significant foreign investment in land in Ethiopia by parties from Africa and further afield. This is primarily geared towards producing for the export market, and is often concentrated in regions with limited political influence.
     
  • In South Sudan, much investment activity appears to be speculative, while Sudan has a long history of large-scale agricultural investment.
     
  • The Ethiopian government appears to be using private capital (most noticeably foreign investment) as a means of generating revenue for the state from peripheral areas. Large-scale land investment should be seen as an extension of the historical processes of state formation.
     
  • Access to accurate information about the extent and nature of large-scale foreign investment in Ethiopian, Sudanese and South Sudanese land is extremely limited. So broader narratives of ‘land-grabbing’ – seeing governments as unwitting victims or as predatory regimes – are a potentially misleading oversimplification in the Horn of Africa, where local populations do not lack agency in this process.
Read the report here:
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Tussle continues over Nigerian SWF and oil revenue management

Check out my guest post on the Oxford SWF Project blog:

http://oxfordswfproject.com/2011/10/25/guest-blog-nigerias-swf-strife-continues/

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Nigeria’s SWF and the Excess Crude Account

Please check out my guest post on the Oxford SWF Project’s site:

http://oxfordswfproject.com/2011/02/23/guest-blog-whither-the-excess-crude-account/

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Whither the ‘new generation’ of African leadership?

When I read that Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi was considering stepping down after the next elections in 2010, I couldn’t help remembering the Clinton administration’s ‘New Generation’ of African leaders: Meles, Eritrean President Isayas Afeworki, Rwandan President Paul Kagame, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and Congolese warlord-turned-president Laurent Kabila.

All of these leaders had come to power through the violent overthrow of existing regimes in their countries, which made the Clinton administration’s characterization particularly odd at the time. Nevertheless, they did at least appear to be open to democratization, which is probably more where the administration was coming from. Certainly in the case of Ethiopia, Eritrea and the DRC, the new regimes appeared a vast improvement on the dictatorships they’d overthrown.

Ten years or so later, they’re all still in power (barring Kabila, whose son Joseph replaced him upon his assassination in 2001 and is still in power):

  • Museveni, who has been in power since 1986 and whose inclusion in the original list of ‘new’ leaders was slightly incongruous anyway, has cleared the way for his pursuit of a third elected term, and will probably win the 2011 election (barring his death — he’ll be 65 this year).
  • Kagame is firmly in control of Rwanda’s politics, and shows no signs of leaving power anytime soon. Political space is fairly well controlled by the regime.
  • Isayas has tightened his grip, and no elections or other transfer of power are in prospect for the foreseeable future. His regime has sponsored rebels in Ethiopia, funded factions in Somalia’s conflict and even picked a fight with Djibouti over their border.

If Meles leads the way and steps down, will it be the beginning of a trend in the region? I’m not optimistic.

Even if it did, the trend wouldn’t necessarily be a welcome one. First of all, Meles isn’t talking about completely leaving power: he’s mooted staying on as leader of the EPRDF, but allowing a successor to take over as PM. Moreover, although the regime has certainly delivered on some developmental goals — especially in terms of physical infrastructure — political space remains severely constrained. Opposition parties barely registered in the April 2008 local elections, after the ruling party came back with a strong response to the challenge it faced in the 2005 general elections (when opposition parties expanded their parliamentary representation from 12 to nearly 200 seats). The leaders of oppsition parties have been jailed recently. The government also recently passed a law restricting ‘foreign’ NGOs from working in areas considered politically sensitive, including women’s and children’s rights and conflict resolution. ‘Foreign NGOs’ are now defined as any which receive more than 10% of funding from abroad, a very low threshold.

Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda have definitely seen some economic development during the past ten years, although the same can’t be said of the DRC and Eritrea. The global economic downturn will prove a serious challenge to all these governments, in terms of maintaining that growth. These and other leaders may now find themselves facing the consequences of not opening political freedoms apace during the boom years, in terms of increased social unrest during the economic squeeze.

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